The direction Germanys Foreign Policy took between 1871 and 1890 Essay Example for Free

The direction Germanys Foreign Policy took between 1871 and 1890 Essay To what extent was Bismarck in control of the direction Germanys Foreign Policy took between 1871 and 1890? To this very day Otto Von Bismarck remains one of the most significant political figureheads of modern Germany. This stature derives from his contribution to the creation and shaping of the modern German state as Prussian minister president and imperial chancellor from 1862 to 1890. Until his resignation in 1890, Bismarck had a relatively freehand in conducting foreign policy. After three successful wars, he saw his task as promoting peace and gaining time so that the powerful German Empire would come to be accepted as natural. Bismarcks two areas of concern were the Balkans, where the disintegration of the Turkish empire could easily lead to conflict between the Habsburg monarchy and Russia, and France, where the desire to avenge the defeat at Sedan was strong. In each area a general European conflagration could flare up and involve Germany. In the following I am going to investigate the extent of which Bismarck was in control of Germanys Foreign Policy between 1871 and 1890. In the two decades proceeding the unification of Germany Bismarck was the dominant statesman of Europe, controlling the policy of Germany, settling disputes between other countries, and entangling all of Europe into a complex web of alliances and understandings, all of which were intended to preserve peace in Europe. If Germany made a foolish decision, this could ensue the disintegration of the whole system. In order to understand how the system created by Bismarck was dependant on Germany it is necessary to examine the predicament each power was in. The powers can be divided into two different classes: the satiated powers, Germany and Britain who were happy with the status quo; and the malcontent powers, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary, which still had interest in European expansion In my opinion, one man cannot control the course of one nations history, although there can be no disputing that Bismarck was a wonderfully skilled and talented politician, I feel he acted to situations as they arose, rather than orchestrating events. Therefore I perceive Bismarck as an interventionist rather than an intentionalist. It is possible to conclude that if a European conflict were to develop, it would occur in one of two places. The first possibility was a conflict between France and Germany over the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine on the Rhine; the second would be a conflict involving either Austria or Britain against Russia in the Balkans. One argument to imply that Bismarck was in full control of the direction of German Foreign Policy between 1871 and 1890 was his radical change of policy. In the decade preceding the Unification, Germany was involved in three wars, which Bismarck had instigated, in order to achieve the United Germany. For the rest of Bismarcks career Germany remained at peace (Lee, Stephen one of the leading historians of European history, he presents both arguments on my debate, therefore he is a reliable historian to quote). Bismarck wanted to focus on maintaining the unified Germany as it was. This is very clear and accurate as for twenty years, following the Unification; Germany was never at war. One possibility where a European Conflict could occur was between France and Germany on the Rhine. It could be argued that Bismarck was fully in control of this situation and that the isolation of France was due to Bismarcks careful planning. It may be suggested that Bismarck premeditated that France would eventually seek revenge for their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck was not afraid of France alone, but he wanted to ensure that France would not align herself with Russia or Austria; therefore he set about isolating France through a series of complex and intricate treaties. The first of Bismarcks complex web of alliance was the Dreikaiserbund (1872), also known as the League of the Three Emperors (1872). Bismarcks aim for forming this League was to isolate France by expanding relations with Austria and Russia. The partners were Kaiser William I of Germany, Tsar Alexander II of Russia and Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. These three rulers agreed to maintain the existin g territorial arrangements in Europe; to resist the spread of revolutionary (e.g. socialist) movements; and to consult one another if any international difficulties arose. France was deviously being diplomatically isolated. This understanding, strengthened Germanys position in Europe and helped to maintain the Status Quo. A further strategy of Bismarcks in the isolation of France was how Bismarck had tactfully encouraged France to expand overseas in the hope of diverting her attention away from Alsace-Lorraine. French annexation of Tunis in northern Africa in 1881 alienated Italy. Italy was thus driven into Bismarcks camp in anger. Therefore Italy joined The Triple Alliance of 1882. The terms of the alliance if Italy or Germany were attacked by France, each would aid the other; if Austria was attacked by Russia, Italy would remain neutral, although Austria would aid Italy if she was attacked by France; if one of the parties was attacked by two or more powers, the other signatories were to come to her aid; and at Italys request, both Austria and Germany agreed that in no case would the Treaty operate against Britain. Consequently, by this time, a powerful bloc had been formed in central Europe. Germany was now guaranteed against Russia by Austria, and against France by Italy. Bismarck had successfully kept the friendship of Russia, Austria and Italy and kept France completely isolated. He was indeed a skilful diplomat who was able to handle the European powers for Germanys advantage. Moreover, following these alliances, Bismarck formed the Reinsurance Treaty (1887) with Russia. This Treaty on its face did not do much. Both Russia and Germany promised to remain neutral in case the other was involved in a war with a great power, except for a Russian attack on Austria, or a German one on France. Since there were the only two possible conflicts, it seems the treaty might be useless. This, however, is not true. As Bismarck explained, Our relations with Russia depend exclusively on the personal feeling of the Tsar Alexander III, and such a treaty brought Germany up a notch in the Tsars eyes. Thus the Treaty led to better Russo-German understanding, and at least temporarily lowered the chance of a Russo-French alliance. The complicated set of treaties and alliances show Bismarck to be in control and carefully planning for all eventualities. James Joll supports this view; Bismarck needed to ensure that France remained isolated and thus unable to think in terms of revenge for 1870 and of war for the recovery of Alsace Lorraine. On the other hand, a case can be constructed to argue that Bismarck was not in full control, that he was a revisionist, reacting to events as they arose, this is obvious in the instance of Bismarcks policy of French isolation. According to D. Richards, Bismarck was willing to run the risk of alienating French feeling because, Firstly. France would take many years to recover from the Franco-Prussian war. Secondly. he could use the bogey of a French war of revenge to make the Reichstag maintain a high level of German armaments. And. Thirdly. his diplomatic genius could keep France isolated. But the first of these assumptions was grossly misplaced, showing Bismarcks naivety. The French recovery was faster that Bismarck had anticipated. The indemnity was paid off by 1873 and they rebuilt their army. The popular French press began to demand the return of Alsace Lorraine. During 1874 and 1875 the French increased their regiment sizes by approximately thirty-five per cent and ordered an extension of the cavalry and armaments division. Bismarck made a further blunder, believing that the French establishing an overtly democratic Republic would frighten off Russia and Britain, Bismarck demanded an increase in the army budget from the Reichstag. This led to the German press commenting on a war in sight crisis. Moreover, Britain and Russia pledged their allegiance to France if Germany declared war. From this it appears as if Bismarck lived in the moment and responded to its challenge (Taylor, again Taylor is another leading historian on this topic and is a reliable source). He reacted to problems as they manifested rather than avoiding them. Also, from this it seems as though, Bismarck caused many of the problems. Perhaps the most important argument supporting the intentionalist viewpoint is Bismarcks role as the honest broker at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, he was more interested in European peace than German Empire building. Bismarck can clearly been seen as one of the strongest proponents of peace in the Eastern Crisis of 1877, this is apparent, even before the crisis. Bismarck understood that there was a European Conflict, just waiting to happen in the Balkans. He saw that Russia, occupying the majority of Europes eastern flank, her interests lay in the expansion of her power in the Balkans, with her ultimate goal being the straits and Tsarograd. Bismarck construed that Austria-Hungary was the opposition to Russian expansion, as it had been expanding in that direction since 1866. Russia was the more powerful state, and Austria would need Germanys backing to defeat it. However, Russia feared a recreation of the Crimean Alliance, if she was to move to close to the Straits. To control the problem, in 1876, Bismarck proposed a solution, he suggested that Britain take Egypt and the Suez, Austria take Bosnia, while the Russians take Bulgaria, which left a much weakened Turkey to occupy the Straits, removing one of the sore spots of Europe off the map (Langer). Bismarck saw that the Balkans was the most likely place for a major conflict to occur and had reduced the chances of this. Despite, Bismarcks earlier attempts a crisis in the east developed when Russia was quick to react to the plight of the Slavs when Turkey attempted to quench an uprising in Bulgaria. Britain was not as antagonistic to Russian expansion as it had been previously. British public opinion moved to the Turkish side, after the tiny fortress of Plevna held out against Russian assaults for five months. Moreover the Treaty of San Stefano lay counter to 1877 accords signed with Austria, and was also highly offensive to Britain, since it gave Bulgaria, and via Bulgaria to Russia access to the Mediterranean. The decision of the powers was that the eastern question was to be decided at a Congress of Berlin, with the German chancellor acting as honest broker. Under the Congress, and Bismarcks advising the newly created Bulgaria was split into three parts: Bulgaria, Rumelia and Macedonia. Macedonia stayed under Turkish control. Rumelia was to be administered by Turkey, but Turkish troops never reoccupied the province. Bulgaria was to be set up as an independent state, but in reality was to be a Russian puppet. Austria was allowed to occupy, though not to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bismarck was extremely important to a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Even before the crisis, Bismarck was approached by Russia, asking if Germany would remain neutral in case of an Austro-Russian war. Bismarcks response was very similar to all his responses to this question throughout his rule: we could endure that our friends should lose or win battles against each other, but not that one of the two should be so severely wounded and injured that its position as an independent Great Power would be endangered. Bismarck knew that he needed Russia to protect its northern border and Austria to secure its western border. He was unwilling to choose between Russia and Austria, since he needed both countries to counterbalance each other, the weakening of either one meant greater German dependency on the other. The reasons that Bismarck wanted peace were completely in line with Realpolitik: he wanted peace because peace and the status quo were favorable to Germany. The Eastern crisis demonstrates Bismarcks genius as a politician, planning and manipulating situations to his advantage, in order to maintain the status quo. However, an argument could be composed from a revisionist viewpoint, William Carr suggests, The truth is that he acted once again on the spur of the moments to deal with an emergency situation-largely of his own making. This is demonstrated with his involvement in the Eastern Crisis. The first instance is shown with his dealing of the Balkan problem in1876. A solution he proposed that the British seize control of Egypt and the Suez; Austria takes Bosnia, Russia controls Bulgaria, leaving a weak Turkey to occupy the Straits. Bismarck, of his own accord, admitted that this was a picture of his fancy, rather than an immediate practicable solution. Hereafter Bismarck reveals his ignorance of world affairs. Moreover Taylor writes, the days of European upheaval were over; they would not come again until one of the powers felt itself strong enough to challenge the balance which had been established at the congress of Berlin. This suggests that a conflict may never have actually erupted, since Germany was the most powerful state in Europe, it would also be the deciding force in any European war. Going to war against it would be foolish unless the opposing coalition had one more great power than the coalition, which was supported by Germany. Thus, Bismarcks involvement was meaningless and actually could have disrupted the status quo. Perhaps the most important argument supporting the intentionalist view is Bismarcks control of the Austro-Russian friendship and that of Germany, and the Alliance System, he employed to maintain their relationship. According to Langer, No other statesman of standing had ever before shown the same great moderation and sound political sense of the possible and the desirable, this can clearly be justified. There were five main understandings and alliances, which were established during the two decades, following the Unification of Germany, by Bismarck to obtain peace within Europe, and fundamentally between Austria and Russia. The first of which was in 1873 when he created a set of treaties between Austria, Russia and Germany, which created the Three Emperors League (Dreikaiserbund) Although the Dreikaiserbund was not an official treaty of alliance, it was an agreement by the three leaders to maintain a close association so that, the maintenance of the peace of Europe be secured, and if necessary defended from every quarter (Gordon Craig, is again an expert in this field and his book Germany 1866-1945, is critically acclaimed and an extremely reliable source). The pact pronounced a step forward in the preservation of peace, if only through the very fact that the agreement was signed. It marked a rapprochement both between Germany and Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hungary and Russia, moreover between Germany and Russia. The dà ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½tente between Austria and Russia was extremely important to preserving the peace in the Balkans, because they had to agree on compromises over influence and maintenance of the ba lance of power to avoid war. The initiation of dialogue, between the two countries, although informal, was a huge step forward. Moreover the reaffirmed friendship between Austria and Germany was a sign that the tension between the two, over Germanys defeat of Austria in 1866, had eased. Although the pact was unofficial, it sent a message to France that the conservative eastern block had been rebuilt. Thus the Dreikaiserbund, indirectly, reduced the threat of war on two fronts, on the Rhineland and in the Balkans. The second instance where Bismarck created an alliance to maintain peace between Austria, Russia and Germany herself, was the Dual Alliance. This was an agreement by Germany and Austria in which either power would assist the other in attacked by Russia, and would stay neutral in case of an attack by any other power. An argument may suggest that Bismarck implemented this alliance in order to diplomatically isolate France. This caused the Russians to seek an alliance with Germany, as they needed Germanys backing for their expansion in the Balkans. Bismarck, however, was more interested in a three party agreement, since it was the only system offering the maximum of stability for the peace of Europe (Langer, A leading authority in the field of diplomatic history, wrote extensively on the diplomatic climate preceding World Wars I and II. His work includes, European Alliances and Alignments). Although Russia was not directly interested in an alliance with Austria, it had to conclude one in order to get German support in the Balkans. Bismarck intentionally manipulated Russia into seeking an alliance with Germany, which led to the Second Dreikaiserbund in 1881. In this instance, again supporting the intentionalist argument, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany agreed that if any of the signatories found itself at war with a fourth power (except Turkey), the other two promised to remain neutral, thus destroying any likelihood of France finding any allies for a revenge war with Germany. Furthermore Bismarck tactically removed tension between Russia and Austria and, according to Rich, provided a foothold for negotiations between them in the event of a crisis. Bismarck had found two allies in Russia and Austria and had isolated France, by planning and maneuvering events to his advantage. Preceding this Bismarck created the Triple Alliance, between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. This again demonstrates the intentionalist argument, where Bismarck anticipated that Russia and France might still have formed an agreement; he extended the Dual Alliance to Italy. His reasoning for this was that Germany should always seek to be part of a larger combination, when there are five [powers], try to be a trois. Moreover a purpose of this alliance was to reduce the likelihood of Italy going to war against Austria in a general conflict. As Bismarck put it, he would be happy if one Italian corporal with the Italian flag and a drummer at his side should take the field on the western front, and not on the eastern front. The alliance provided the support of Italy or Germany in case of a French attack, support in case of an attack by two great powers on any of the signatories, and neutrality in case one of the powers was threatened and forced to make war, respectively. Thus the alliance created a situation where no power could attack any other power without having all of Europe against it. Bismarck had reduced the chances of waging war successfully, and therefore the chances of war in general fell. The intentionalist case is supported further, since after the bond between Austria and Russia, which Bismarck had built, was disrupted by the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885 and posed the threat of Russias gravitation towards France, he formed The Reinsurance Treaty of 1887, in strict secrecy. This guaranteed that Russia would remain neutral in the event of any war between Germany and France, provided that France was the aggressor. Ultimately, Bismarck had carefully and systematically crafted a system of alliances and agreements, which if properly used and maintained would keep Europe at peace. The alternative argument is that Bismarck simply reacted to events, with no clear structure and certainly with no overall scheme, in an attempt to maintain relations with and between Russia and Austria. It is argued that the other powers provided him with his opportunities, all he had to do is manipulate these at short notice (lee). This case is strongly supported by A.J.P. Taylor, who maintained that Bismarck lived in the moment and responded to its challenge. An argument for a more careless and impulsive Bismarck it may be compiled, although the Dreikaiserbund did reduce the risk of war with France by creating and allegiance between Germany and Russia, it was in fact Tsar Alexander II who suggested Russias membership, Bismarck merely accepted the opportunity (Lee). Following the Balkan Crisis, as Taylor argues, Bismarck rushed into the Dual Alliance with Austria and he was manipulated to such an extent, he was forced to say to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Andrassy, If you will no accept my terms, then I am forced to accept yours. After his initial carelessness Bismarck attempted to compensate by renewing the Dreikaiserbund in 1881, attempting to prevent his mistake that if a war between Russia and Austria occurred, Germany would be on the side of Austria. Also he tried to compensate by forming the Triple alliance, to prevent Italy from attacking Austria and to help in any war between Germany and France. After the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885, which threatened Bismarcks hasty arrangements, Bismarck created the secret Reinsurance Treaty, which so easily could have ruined the Dual Alliance, which is why his successors failed to renew it. Bismarck had created a web of alliances and agreements on the spur of the moments, that was so intertwined and complex that the next Chancellor, Caprivi, found that the system was already on the verge of collapse. Malcolm Pasely goes as far as to suggest that the alliances themselves would never be successful because they were too weak, The new structure was fragile, suggesting how the Triple Alliance was inferior and could easily collapses, as it did after the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885. Another point, indicating that Bismarck was not in control of Germanys foreign policy, is how during this time of elevated discussion and activity between Germany and the rest of Europe, Bismarck failed to involve Britain, who at the time was the most powerful nation in the world. At this time Britain had interests connected with the continent, the main one being the preservation of Turkey in order to prevent Russian control of the Dardannelles and Bosphorus. Most of the British interests lay in her numerous colonies, and an absence of a strong army kept Britain from actively participating in continental affairs. Her fleet, however, remained a threat to any power with maritime interests. Thus she was able to bully Russians into staying away from the straits, lest Britain recreate the Crimean alliance, or even attack Russia itself. In failing to concern Britain, Bismarck was unsuccessful in forming an ally against Russia On the other hand, it could be argued that Bismarck had no reason to involve Britain, as she was one of the two satiated powers and was interested in maintaining the status quo. Moreover Britain was an island, and was in a stage of isolationism. Involving Britain may have upset the Status Quo and resulted in further complications. Both arguments are extremely strong, and it is very hard to decide which is the stronger. Andrew Bonar Law said that, There is no such thing as an inevitable war. If war comes it will be from a failure of human wisdom, I believe that Bismarck engineered Germany to maintain peace within Europe. However, whether Bismarck was in control of the bearing that Germanys foreign politics took between 1870 and 1890 is debatable and I perpetuate that Bismarck was an interventionist, rather than an intentionalist. He maneuvered and manipulated events as they happened, rather than foreseeing and planning for the events that arose. This is explanatory by the state of foreign affairs that Caprivi inherited, which ultimately led to the First World War. The Reinsurance Treaty that Bismarck had forged with Tsar Alexander II was a secret Treaty that Caprivi thought was too risky and could have easily wrecked the Dual Alliance. He failed to resign the Treaty, therefore relations between Germany and Russia disintegrated and Russia began to gravitate toward France. Thus Bismarcks perplexed and somewhat confusing web of Treaties and Alliances, which were in a precarious position, became untangled, and hence World War One erupted. Therefore it is possible to argue that, although Bismarck managed to keep the newly United Germany at peace, what Law suggests is true of Bismarck, that in fact it was through Bismarcks failure of human wisdom that the First World war occurred.